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ABSTRACT
The IMF attempts to stabilize private capital flows to emerging markets by providing public
monitoring and emergency finance. In analyzing its role we contrast cases where banks and
bondholders do the lending. Banks have a natural advantage in monitoring and creditor
coordination, while bonds have superior risk sharing characteristics. Consistent with this
assumption, banks reduce spreads as they obtain more information through repeat transactions
with borrowers. By comparison, repeat borrowing has little influence in bond markets, where
publicly-available information dominates. But spreads on bonds are lower when they are issued
in conjunction with IMF-supported programs, as if the existence of a program conveyed positive
information to bondholders. The influence of IMF monitoring in bond markets is especially

















Catalyzing private capital flows to emerging markets has been an objective of the 
International Monetary Fund since at least the 1990s.
2  The Fund provides public 
monitoring services and negotiates programs that enable borrowers to reveal their 
commitment to sound macroeconomic policies. In addition, its own lending may stabilize 
capital flows by providing bridge finance for creditworthy countries experiencing 
liquidity crises, the resolution of which may be difficult to coordinate for atomistic 
lenders.  
In this paper we seek to better understand the roles of IMF monitoring and 
lending and provide new evidence of their effects. We analyze the impact of IMF-
supported programs on market access and the cost of funds, building on three insights.  
·  First, if banks engage in monitoring as part of their normal operation, then IMF 
monitoring should have a relatively limited impact when bank syndicates do the 
lending. 
·  Second, private capital flows should be particularly sensitive to the magnitude of 
IMF financial commitments when the likelihood of debt restructuring is high.  
·  Third, precautionary programs are a mechanism through which governments can 
use their relationship with the IMF to signal their commitment to strong policies. 
Differences in the impact of precautionary and regular IMF programs should 
therefore be useful for distinguishing between the Fund’s monitoring and lending 
roles. 
                                                 
2 See for example IMF (1999).   2 
Our analysis is based on more than 6,700 loan transactions between emerging 
market borrowers and international bank syndicates and some 3,500 new bond issues 
placed between 1991 and 2002. We analyze the frequency of transactions and the spreads 
charged.  Among the explanatory variables are (a) a measure of repeat borrowing that 
proxies for creditor learning about borrower characteristics and (b) the existence and size 
of IMF programs.  Because we analyze individual transactions rather than aggregate 
capital flows or other macroeconomic conditions, our findings are less susceptible to 
causality running from the outcome to the decision to initiate an IMF program.
3 
Important differences between bank loans and bond issues have been documented 
in the domestic context.
4 Banks act as delegated monitors on behalf of investors who 
cannot easily observe and discipline borrowers (Diamond 1984). The information they 
acquire can be used to limit the use of funds and in pricing loans. In contrast, individual 
bondholders lack the incentive to incur the costs of securing expensive private 
information about borrowers. Instead, public information—for example, the information 
assembled by credit rating agencies—dominates the market for debt securities. 
Securitized debt instruments, on the other hand, have superior risk-sharing 
characteristics. Credit risk can be diversified away, in part, by spreading individual loans 
across investors and enabling them to hold diversified portfolios. Banks cannot engage in 
this practice to the same extent without eroding their incentive to invest in dedicated 
                                                 
3 High-frequency data also allow us to capture the timing of programs more precisely than 
is possible in aggregate studies using annual data to analyze the influence of IMF 
programs. 
4 This difference between bank and capital markets has been well documented in the 
domestic US context (see, for example, Fama 1985 and James 1987).    3 
monitoring technologies. This tradeoff is a way of understanding why lending takes place 
through both banks and bond markets. 
Banks can also more easily coordinate in response to default and restructuring. 
They are relatively few in number and contractual arrangements such as sharing clauses 
reduce the incentive to hold out. The advantages of creditor coordination may make it 
even more profitable for banks to monitor borrowers, as we explain below.  Thus, it is not 
necessary to assume that banks have intrinsically superior monitoring ability; they may 
simply have more incentive to invest in gathering and using relevant information. 
  Eichengreen and Mody (1998) find that spreads on syndicated loans fall with the 
number of loans extended to a borrower. An interpretation is that contact through repeat 
borrowing informs creditors about borrower characteristics, reducing uncertainty and risk 
premia. That earlier paper did not also consider repeat borrowing in bond markets. We do 
so here, hypothesizing that this effect is stronger for bank loans than bonds because 
coordination allows banks to make better use of any information thereby gleaned. 
The other potential monitor is the IMF.
5  By putting a program in place, the Fund 
may be able to acquire information not also available to the private sector or acquire it at 
lower cost. Indeed, the Fund may convey information to the markets when it does not 
have superior monitoring technology. Negotiating an IMF program may simply be a way 
for a government to signal its type.
6 Imagine that the standard conditions attached to 
                                                 
5 As posited by Tirole (2002), Mody and Saravia (2003) and Bordo, Mody, and Oomes 
(2004). 
6 Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004) have argued that the IMF’s monitoring role does not 
imply that the Fund has better information than the market. As such, the Fund adds value 
not through the mere signaling of new information. Rather, the Fund can monitor 
commitment to a policy program (see also Mody and Saravia 2003). In practice it is 
difficult to distinguish if it is content of the program or the monitoring that is relevant.   4 
Fund programs are easier to satisfy for either economic or political reasons by 
governments truly committed to strong policies and that violating that conditionality has 
significant costs.  Then a country with strong policies will be more likely to sign up for a 
program, signaling its type and lowering its spreads. 
A special case in point is when an IMF lending arrangement is converted into a 
precautionary program.
7 A country then volunteers to not draw on IMF resources while 
still allowing itself to be subjected to Fund monitoring and conditionality.
8   The Fund’s 
monitoring should be particularly important for bond markets not inhabited by a small 
number of large investors (banks) prepared to individually invest in ascertaining the 
government’s type. At the same time, IMF lending, by reducing the probability of 
default, could nullify the creditor coordination advantage of banks. 
Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that repeat borrowing is more important 
in reducing the costs of borrowing from bank syndicates than bond markets.  In contrast, 
public monitoring through IMF programs has a larger impact on spreads in markets 
dominated by bonds than bank loans, again consistent with our priors.  But the IMF’s 
presence and lending have different effects on countries in different situations. For 
countries with external debt/GDP ratios below 60 per cent range, it is the IMF’s presence, 
as distinct from its lending, that matters for bond market access. We interpret this as 
consistent with arguments emphasizing the Fund’s monitoring and signaling roles. As 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, because we do observe that programs (with widely varying conditionality) 
reduce bond interest rate spreads, it is possible to argue that the monitoring that 
accompanies the core conditionality in all IMF programs helps creditors gain confidence 
in the likelihood of reduced policy variability. 
7 For more discussion of the channels through which IMF programs can influence 
international capital flows, see Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) and Bordo, Mody, and 
Oomes (2004). 
8 Although the financial support can still become available should the need arise.   5 
debt rises from there, IMF presence is still associated with lower spreads but to a 
diminishing extent.  The impact of IMF presence disappears when debt reaches 70 
percent of GDP. Moreover, there is little evidence in this high debt range that additional 
IMF lending reduces spreads and enhances market access. For countries in this range, 
neither IMF presence nor IMF lending significantly enhances market access. Evidently, 
countries with such high debts have deep structural problems that must be solved before 
IMF intervention can catalyze external finance. Only programs that turn precautionary – 
that is, where the outlook improves sufficiently that the country can voluntarily choose to 
stop drawing on Fund resources – have a significant negative impact on borrowing costs 
at high debt levels. This finding is again consistent with our arguments regarding country 
signaling and IMF monitoring.  
The next section develops the theoretical background to these issues.  The two 
sections following that then provide evidence on differences in international lending 
through bank loans and bond markets. We then analyze the factors that go into the 
decision to borrow and the further choice between loans and bonds.  The results confirm 
that IMF programs do more to facilitate bond issuance than bank lending. Finally, we 
document the importance for the pricing of loans and bonds of private monitoring in bank 
lending and of public monitoring through IMF programs in bond markets. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Our theoretical discussion focuses on sovereign default, renegotiation, and 
endogenous problems of liquidity in highlighting the IMF’s monitoring and creditor-
coordination roles.  Our point of departure, following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow   6 
and Rogoff (1989), and Kletzer and Wright (2000), is that lenders and borrowers take 
into account the risk of default when agreeing to the terms of a debt contract. Changes in 
this risk will therefore be reflected in the volume of debt and interest rates. Our 
discussion is also informed by Tirole’s (2002) exposition of dual and common agency 
problems in the context of international financial contracts. As Tirole notes, the 
government may become an agent even when the debt contract is between private 
borrowers and lenders, since government actions bear on a private debtor’s ability to 
repay.  Private debt can have sovereign risk as a result of explicit or implicit government 
guarantees and/or a debtor’s recourse to domestic legal protection.  We therefore assume 
that the envelope of resources and government policies determines the ability and 
willingness of the government and private creditors to repay.
9  
The logic of our argument can be summarized as follows.  First, country 
fundamentals and government policies determine the ability and willingness of the 
government and private creditors to service their debts. This implies that the probability 
of default rises only after a threshold level of debt is reached, at which point access to 
credit markets weakens and spreads on new loans begin to rise.
10  Second, in the presence 
of asymmetric information about borrower preferences, the ability of creditors to monitor 
debtors and make use of information will influence market behavior and outcomes. 
Creditor monitoring matters when debt restructuring can occur—in other words, it 
matters for countries with high debt levels and low credit ratings. A monitoring 
                                                 
9 Even if a private borrower derives no protection from its home government’s 
sovereignty, the analytics apply to any debtor that faces bounded penalties for defaulting. 
10 For low debt levels, an increase in debt may indicate improving fundamentals and thus 
result in narrower spreads, as suggested by Pattillo et al (2003). 
   7 
advantage can arise not just when some creditors are better informed than others but also 
when some creditors more readily respond to common information.
11 
An implication is that creditors with a monitoring advantage will tend to lend in 
markets where the return to monitoring is high, and conversely. When banks have a 
monitoring advantage, information about the debtor’s policy preferences will affect terms 
on bank loans and bonds. IMF programs can also reveal and provide confidence in debtor 
government policies, reducing the common agency problem, but providing information 
can also reduce the advantage of private monitoring. Monitoring differences will also 
affect returns to learning about the debtor.     
To further develop these points, we utilize a simple framework in which the 
debtor’s resources are stochastic and all debt claims have the same maturity and priority. 
The debtor is willing to repay a maximal amount, V(y), in expected present value, in 
equilibrium. V(y) is the value of repaying in a forward-looking equilibrium that takes 
account of opportunities to renegotiate debt in the future.  It is increasing in the 
fundamental, y. For strong fundamentals, y, or low levels of debt, V(y) exceeds D, and 
the debtor will repay. If, however, the outstanding debt, D, exceeds V(y), then the debtor 
is unwilling to meet its obligations and will seek to renegotiate.   
  When borrowing and repayment are repeated over time, the debtor’s willingness 
to pay can be written as  
(1)        ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
+ +
+ = t t t t V E
r
y w y V , 
                                                 
11 For example, banks can have a comparative advantage in creditor coordination in the 
context of debt renegotiation (when there are advantages to getting all creditors to take 
the same position). They may also be in a relatively favorable position to arrange 
concerted lending and thus control strategic uncertainty that can cause liquidity crises.   8 
where  ( ) t y w  indicates the debtor’s equilibrium willingness to service debt today.  An 
interpretation is that  ( ) t y w  represents the debtor’s liquid resources and  1 + t V  measures 
solvency. Under perfect information, current debt service obligations that cannot be met 
by the debtor ( ( ) t t y V D > ) will be rolled over into new loans, while debts that will not be 
repaid in present value will be renegotiated.  
The expected net return to creditors is given by 
(2)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t t D r D y V D D y V D y V V E ER + - > + £ £ = 1 Pr Pr : , 
where r is the return on alternative investments. The interest rate spread will be the 
difference between  t t D ER /  and (1+r). This spread is increasing with the level of debt for 
positive probabilities that  ( ) t y V  is less than  t D . When the level of debt is low, this 
probability can be zero, in which case the spread does not rise with indebtedness.  But as 
indebtedness rises further, the probability of default becomes positive, as does the risk 
premium. Models of debt renegotiation with perfect information thus imply that spreads 
will not increase with debt at low debt-to-GDP ratios but that they will start rising at an 
accelerating rate after the debt-to-GDP ratio passes a critical threshold.  This is 
corroborated by our empirical work, below. 
  To motivate the role of monitoring, it is necessary to introduce information 
asymmetries. Assume that the debtor’s willingness to pay is known by others with 
uncertainty. Specifically, suppose that lenders only know the distribution of the debtor’s 
willingness to pay,  ( ) t y V , within an interval,  ( ) ( ) [ ] t t y V y V , .  For simplicity, the 
distribution can be taken as uniform around a mean equal to ( ) t y V .  The debtor can offer 
repayment,  ( ) t y V ˆ , less than its true willingness to repay. Consistent with standard   9 
analyses, the equilibrium offer accepted by lenders yields repayment,  ( ) t y V ˆ , equal to the 
debtor’s actual willingness to pay when this equals its minimum value,  ( ) t y V .  For larger 
realizations of  ( ) t y V , the debtor will transfer less than its true willingness to pay and 
realize a positive surplus given by the difference,  ( ) ( ) t t y V y V ˆ - .  
The debtor pays in full if  ( ) t t D y V ³ ˆ . Because actual repayments are less than the 
debtor’s true capacity, the probability of default is higher and creditors’ expected returns 
are lower when information is asymmetric.   
   Creditors can extract more surplus if monitoring helps them to become better 
informed about the debtor’s future policy actions. Monitoring increases willingness to 
pay, raising returns in the event of renegotiation and reducing the probability that 
renegotiation occurs. If lenders learn about the characteristics of borrowers from repeat 
lending, as appears to be the case from the evidence reported below, then spreads should 
fall with repeat transactions. Similarly, if the IMF has an advantage in monitoring the 
policy actions of the debtor, then agreement to establish an IMF program should reduce 
spreads and increase debt issuance for a debtor with a positive probability of having to 
renegotiate.    
  Our empirical analysis in Section 5 below points to differences in the impact of 
repeat lending and IMF programs on bank loans and bond spreads.
12 An explanation 
consistent with our findings is that banks and bondholders have different monitoring 
abilities. Banks will cater to smaller, less well established borrowers, since they 
presumably possess a superior monitoring technology.  Bondholders will focus on large, 
                                                 
12 See Section 5 below. 
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well-known borrowers.
13 The private information revealed by clients to their banks will 
then make more precise the bankers’ views of their capacity to repay. On the other hand, 
if banks have a monitoring advantage over bondholders, then an improvement in public 
information resulting from an IMF program could reduce (or in the limit remove) that 
informational advantage, reducing bond spreads and encouraging bond issuance relative 
to bank loans.  
With asymmetric information, the adoption of an IMF program can reveal 
information to capital markets about country policies and willingness to pay. This does 
not hinge on the assumption that the IMF has superior ability to collect or interpret data; 
the Fund may simply have the ability to commit to actions to which private investors 
cannot or will not commit.
14 To the extent that the IMF has a superior ability to commit 
or objectives that differ from those of private investors, adoption of a Fund program can 
also reveal information about the debtor country.  In turn this allows the government to 
signal its intentions.
15 For example, the conditionality associated with an IMF loan might 
be less onerous for governments for which policy reforms are less costly, thus making it 
incentive compatible for such governments to sign up with the Fund in order to signal its 
type.  Countries with stronger policies or a greater will to enact policy reform are thus 
able to reveal this information by negotiating a Fund agreement.  Of course, adopting a 
                                                 
13 See Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) for U.S. evidence consistent with this pattern. 
14 It should be possible to model the IMF as endogenously gaining a monitoring 
advantage through its ability to commit to lend only in a crisis in a repeated game. The 
approach of self-enforcing equilibrium taken by Kletzer and Wright (2000) in the 
sovereign debt context could be used to model de facto IMF seniority and why countries 
might meet IMF conditionality.  
15 Marchesi and Thomas 1999 offer a model in which Fund conditionality serves as a 
screening device.    11 
program may also reveal poor fundamentals, and not just a superior capacity to enact 
policy reforms, resulting in an overall ambiguous impact on spreads.  
IMF programs sometimes turn precautionary: borrowing stops, but the 
government continues paying a commitment fee that gives it the option to resume 
borrowing. By turning a program precautionary, the debtor country government can thus 
reveal that it has a diminished need for official finance but a continuing commitment to 
prudent policies. This good news should be reflected in a reduction in spreads on both 
bank loans and bonds.  
Debt restructuring can also give rise to differences between banks and 
bondholders if the members of a bank syndicate can more easily coordinate their actions. 
Recall that equation (1) separates current willingness to pay into the sum of current 
resources available for repayment ( ) t y w  and discounted expected future willingness to 
pay.  If coordination failures prevent bondholders from restructuring debts quickly, then 
banks can move first and secure a larger share of the pie.  They can do so even when all 
creditors have identical information and learn at the same time that the debt is 
unsustainable. Recall that 
(3)      ( ) 1 1
1
+ +
+ > + = t t t t t t V E
r
y w L B D , 
where  t B and  t L  are outstanding bonds and bank debt, respectively. Banks can 
reschedule their loans and avoid immediate default by reducing repayments currently due 
while at the same time increasing future repayments by rolling over their loans at higher 
interest rates.  Subsequent renegotiations incorporating equal sharing between 
bondholders and bank lenders will then divide the settlement amount between banks and   12 
bondholders on the basis of the new bank share of the total debt.  To illustrate, let the 
banks reschedule an amount  t L D  of current debt repayments so that 




t L L r B r y w D - + = , 
where  t
bB r  and  t
lL r  are interest payments due on bonds and loans, respectively.  The 
banks then increase loans in period t+1,  1 + t L , by an amount  t L r D ' .  The banks’ share of 
future repayments rises to  




















Since the increase in the value of bank claims comes out of the expected returns to 
bondholders in the event that current total debt is unsustainable, the interest rate ' r  can 
then be chosen to maximize the increase in expected returns, 
(6)      ( )( ) ( ) t t
t t t t t
t t
t L r V
L B L L B
L B
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If the banks can reschedule a sufficient share of their debt, they can eliminate their 
current expected loss at the expense of bondholders. This strategic advantage contrasts 
with a simple principal-agent model in which improved monitoring by banks raises the 
probability of repayment and returns to banks and bondholders alike.
16    
The banks’ strategic advantage can be reduced or eliminated by the presence of a 
more senior official-sector creditor. Since the first-mover advantage arises from the 
prospect of default, it can be reduced by availability of official support under an IMF 
program, assuming that such funding reduces the risk of renegotiation. Absent 
                                                 
16 The sharing of negotiated repayments here contrasts with the assumptions of Bolton 
and Jeanne (2003) that bonds are not renegotiable but bank loans are and separate 
penalties apply in selective defaults.  
   13 
differences in bank and bond markets, the basic model of sovereign debt renegotiation 
with asymmetric information would imply that IMF monitoring and financial resources 
lead to equivalent reductions in bond and bank loan interest spreads.
17 Similarly, if IMF 
conditionality improves fundamentals and growth prospects, then both bond and bank 
lending should increase.  However, if banks have a monitoring advantage and can better 
manage creditor coordination and debt restructuring problems, as assumed here, then 
IMF monitoring that reveals debtor characteristics and IMF lending that reduces the 
likelihood of default will benefit bondholders more than banks.   
  Finally, we consider the role of liquidity crises, adapting the model of Morris and 
Shin (2003).
18  In their model, the fundamental has a distribution that is public 
knowledge, but each lender in a continuum receives a privately observed noisy signal of 
its realization in the current period.
19 In this setting, private information can generate 
coordination failures and produce liquidity crises even when debt is sustainable. 
  We reinterpret their model by distinguishing between banks and bondholders, 
assuming that banks coordinate whereas bondholders do not. If  ( ) t y V  exceeds total debt 
but the country’s current liquid resources fall short of current net payments due, then a 
liquidity crisis is possible. When debtor liquidity falls below a critical level, bondholders 
facing uncertainty about one another’s actions will be unwilling to purchase new bond 
                                                 
17 Gai and Vause 2003 present a model in which the IMF acts as a delegated monitor 
motivated by private creditor coordination failures. Our emphasis on asymmetric private 
abilities to coordinate is different.  
18 Similar models by Rochet and Vives (2001) and Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin 
(2001) also take a global games approach to catalytic finance. Chui, Gai and Haldane 
(2002) also discuss the policy implications of sovereign liquidity crises. 
 
19 Morris and Shin also distinguish short-term debt that amortizes in the current period 
from other debt. 
   14 
issues to replace amortizing debt.
20  This may give rise to an incipient crisis.  That crisis 
may be prevented, however, if bank syndicates replace the maturing bonds with 
additional bank loans.  
Banks are able to do this, in principle, because they can coordinate among 
themselves. Suppose that banks observe both a private signal drawn from the same 
distribution as that of bondholders and the failure of the debtor to place new bond issues. 
They can then halt a liquidity-driven crisis by replacing the maturing bonds with news 
loans. They can move after bondholders exit and have an incentive to do so in order to 
avoid unnecessary defaults on their long-term loans.  Such models thus imply that bank 
loans and bond issues should be negatively correlated if crises are caused by illiquidity. 
Two further implications follow. First, a deterioration in market liquidity or 
increased uncertainty that reduces bond issuance can be mitigated by the presence of 
bank lending, since banks have an incentive to fill the gap. Second, the IMF, as lender in 
a liquidity crisis, can help to avoid costly default and renegotiation.
21 Assume that 
potential purchasers of bonds are as poorly informed about what banks will do as they are 
about what other bondholders will do. Banks move on the basis of private information 
and the reluctance of bondholders to reenter the market. But both bondholders and banks 
should be able to anticipate the IMF’s strategy when a program is in place. Then the 
existence of an IMF program should raise bond issuance relative to bank lending for 
countries susceptible to liquidity-driven crises. We examine this proposition empirically 
below.  
                                                 
20 Morris and Shin (2003) detail the determination of the critical level of liquidity.  For 
our interpretation, we leave out additive debtor effort in their model.   
21 Jeanne (2001) among others discusses the lender of last resort role of the IMF.   15 
 
 
3.  The Setting 
Although international lending through bond markets was prominent in the late 
19
th and early 20
th centuries, from the 1960s through the 1980s private credit flows to 
developing and emerging economies took place mainly through banks. Lending via bond 
markets was about 10 percent of bank lending in the 1970s and early 1980s (Edwards 
1986). This changed following the debt crises of the 1980: between 1991 and 2002, credit 
obtained via banks and bonds was of about the same order of magnitude, just under $700 
billion through each channel (Table 1).
22  
Differences persisted, however, in the characteristics of the typical bank loan and 
bond.  To show this, for each loan and bond in our data set we extracted the initial price, 
the initial maturity, the amount, and the currency of denomination. Borrowers are 
distinguished as sovereign, non-sovereign but public sector, and private sector.
23 On 
average, bank loans are more numerous and smaller. Between 1991 and 2002, Loanware 
reports 6,747 Libor-based syndicated loan transactions; during the same period, 
Bondware reports the issuance of just over 3700 bonds.
24 On average, a bond issue was 
about 70 percent larger than a loan transaction. 
                                                 
22 While we include all bonds issued in our analysis, we restrict the sample of loans to 
those that were priced based on Libor. These form the vast majority of international 
syndicated loans, both in terms of numbers and in the amount borrowed. By limiting the 
loans to those priced off Libor, we believe that more precise estimates of loan pricing 
become possible. 
23 We use these distinctions to also construct an estimate of the numbers that did not 
borrow. Thus, for a given country in a given quarter, the absence of borrowing by the 
sovereign implied that the sovereign had either forgone the opportunity to borrow or had 
not had access to international funds. Similarly, we identify country-quarters where no 
public (non-sovereign) and private borrowing occurred. For more on this, see below. 
24 Of which spreads are available for about 3500   16 
We construct a measure of repeat borrowing, R, separately for bank and bond 
borrowing. Starting with January 1, 1991, the measure takes the value 1 the first time a 
borrower enters into an international debt contract. With each subsequent instance of 
borrowing we then increment the value of R by one. The results show that repeat 
borrowing is more common in bond markets, where the median number of borrowings 
over the period 1991 to 2002 is 3 (the 75
th percentile is 8 and the 90
th percentile is 27); for 
banks, the median is 2 (the 75
th percentile is 4 and the 90
th percentile is 8). Thus, 
compared with banks, which allow a diverse set of clients to episodically borrow, the 
bond market caters to borrowers with name recognition who return frequently.  
Relative to bank loans, bonds were more likely to be issued when the issuing 
country had an IMF-supported program. About 22 percent of loans were contracted when 
a country had a Fund program in place (Table 2). In contrast, just over a third of bonds 
were issued in the presence of a program. To put the point another way, when countries 
were under an IMF program they were about as likely to borrow through a loan or a 
bond, but a loan was more than twice as likely when there was no program.  
While IMF programs appear to shift borrowing toward bonds, this shift does not 
occur uniformly. Table 2 shows that countries with external-debt-to-GDP ratios below 30 
percent had few bond or loan transactions while under IMF programs. When the debt-
ratio was between 30 and 40 percent, more borrowing occurred under IMF programs, 
especially through bonds; however, the number of credit contracts was still higher in 
countries without, rather than with, IMF programs. Countries with debt/GDP ratios in the 
40-60 per cent range play an important role in our analysis. In this category, the 
distribution of credit contracts between program and no program is more even: indeed,   17 
more bonds are issued under a program than when there is no program. Finally, when 
external debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP, countries once again limit their international 
borrowing.  When they do borrow, loans and bonds are equally prevalent.  
 
4.  Patterns of Borrowing 
In this section, we analyze the borrowing decision and the choice between bank 
loans and bonds. The first probit equation (Table 3) estimates the correlates of borrowing 
by sovereign, non-sovereign/public, and private entities in each country-quarter. The 
second equation reports the likelihood of bond issuance rather than a bank transaction. 
Throughout we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable at its mean and the discrete change in the probability for 
dummy variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering since the number of 
borrowing transactions varies from country to country.
25 Explanatory variables include 
issuer characteristics (in this regression, the borrower type, with sovereign as the omitted 
category), global variables (U.S. growth, the swap rate, EMBI volatility), and a vector of 
country characteristics.
26  
Among the global variables, U.S. growth appears to facilitate borrowing, 
especially by bond issuers in the medium-debt range (with a debt/GDP ratio between 40 
and 60 percent). An interpretation is that global growth acts as collateral that supports 
additional borrowing. If the average monthly growth of U.S. industrial production rises 
                                                 
25 This same correction for clustering is made throughout. 
26 More detail on variable definitions and sources can be found in the appendix, below.   18 
from its mean of 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent, the probability of borrowing increases by just 
over one percent.
27 
Higher volatility of J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index, reflecting 
greater uncertainty about pricing, is associated with reduced borrowing. If daily volatility 
increases from its monthly mean of 2 per cent to 3 per cent, the probability of borrowing 
declines by 1½ to 2 percent.     
Higher bond-market volatility also lowers the frequency of bond issuance relative 
to bank loans by borrowers from countries with debt/GDP ratios below 60 percent.
28  A 
one percentage point increase in daily volatility reduces the likelihood of bond issuance 
relative to a bank transaction by 2½-4 percent. An interpretation is that sort-run liquidity 
concerns and financial market disorder are more likely to generate strategic uncertainty 
among bondholders, who may then withdraw to the sidelines on the fear that others are 
doing the same.  In contrast, banks, which are better able to coordinate among 
themselves, are more likely to continue lending.
29 
  Improved credit quality (proxied by Institutional Investor credit ratings, which 
run from a low of 0 to a high of 100) allows for more borrowing both from banks and on 
bond markets. The importance of the credit rating increases when the external-debt/GDP 
ratio exceeds 40 percent. An increase in rating by 10 points from a mean of 52 strongly 
                                                 
27 The measure of US growth used in the regressions is the average of monthly growth 
rates in the quarter in which the transaction occurred.  
28 Where debt ratios are higher, such compositional shifts are not statistically significant. 
29 The Korean crisis in 1997-8, and other similar episodes, remind us that there may be 
limits to such coordination.  But an important fact about the Korean crisis is that, in the 
end, the banks did roll over their loans, albeit at high interest rates.  See for example 
Goldstein (1998).   19 
raises the likelihood of borrowing with no apparent shift in its composition.
30 An 
interpretation is that whereas ratings influence the willingness of lenders to lend, a 
country’s demand for foreign exchange determines how much it wishes to borrow. Thus, 
a higher ratio of debt service to exports increases the demand for external resources, 
thereby raising the likelihood of international borrowing, provided that the debt/GDP 
ratio is below 60 percent. Interestingly, as the debt/GDP ratio rises, the demand for 
external borrowing is increasingly met through loans. Similarly, when countries face 
higher export volatility, they are less likely to borrow abroad; in particularly, they are 
especially prone to reduce their borrowing on bond markets. 
  Bond issues tend also to be larger and longer in term. Whereas the average 
maturity of loans in our sample is 4½ years (the median is just over 3 years), that for 
bonds is 6¼ years (with a median of 5 years).
31  
  IMF programs have limited influence on aggregate borrowing by countries at low 
debt levels, as already suggested by Table 2. Presumably structural problems that limit 
the ability to borrow also cause countries to seek Fund assistance. Table 3 suggests, 
however, that such borrowers are more likely to issue bonds than borrow from banks.  In 
the medium-debt range, a Fund program raises the probability of borrowing by 14 per 
cent. At high debt levels, the influence of IMF programs remains positive, although the 
effect is not statistically significant. 
We also distinguish precautionary programs. A first case is where IMF programs 
are designated as precautionary at outset.  Country authorities declare that they do not 
                                                 
30 The likelihood of borrowing rises by between 16 and 25 percent 
31 A borrower wishing to increase the length of maturity from the average from the 
average bank loan to the average bond maturity is about 3.5 percent (1.75*0.02) more 
likely to issue a bond.   20 
intend to draw on resources made available.
32 Borrowing via both loans and bonds is 
lower in such cases, but mainly for countries in the intermediate debt range. There is thus 
some suggestion in the data that countries choosing to approach the Fund for 
precautionary reasons also behave conservatively in their borrowing from banks and on 
bond markets.  
A second case is when programs turn precautionary.  In this instance the member 
stops drawing on resources available through the program but continues to pay the 




5.  The Pricing of Loans and Bonds 
To analyze pricing, we use the model developed by Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 
2001) and extended by Mody and Saravia (2003). The spreads equation is linear of the 
form: 
log (spread) = ￿X + u1           (1) 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread; X is a vector of issue, issuer, 
and period characteristics; and u1 is a random error. X contains a dummy variable for the 
existence of an IMF program, program characteristics if any, and interactions between the 
program and country characteristics.
34 Since the spread will be observed only when there 
                                                 
32 This declaration is not binding, as noted above. 
33 Although borrowers from countries with high debt/GDP ratios appear to be less likely 
to issue bonds. 
34 As discussed below. 
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is a decision to borrow and lend, we correct for sample selection. Assume that spreads are 
observed when a latent variable B crosses a threshold B' defined by: 
B' = ￿Z + u2               (2) 
where Z is the vector of variables that determines the desire of borrowers to borrow and 
the willingness of lenders to lend (and will also contain the IMF program variables and 
their interactions). u2 is a second error term. We assume that: u1 ~ N(0,￿), u2 ~ N(0,1), and 
corr (u1 , u2 ) = ￿.  This is a sample selection model à la Heckman (1979).  Equations (1) 
and (2) can be estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood. 
Estimating the determinants of market access requires information on 
nonborrowers. As noted above, for each country we consider three categories of issuers: 
sovereign, other public, and private. For each quarter and country where one of these 
issuers did not come to the market, we record a zero, and where they did we record a 
one.
35  
  We use our measure of repeat borrowing, R, to proxy for private monitoring. It is 
likely that the incremental information declines as R rises.  Moreover, since R is 
correlated with the number of debt obligations outstanding, a larger value of R may also 
create greater coordination problems in the event of restructuring.
36   
                                                 
35 Leung and Yu (1996) note that the estimation does not require the variables in the 
selection equation and the spread equation to be different but rather that the variables not 
be concentrated in a small range and that truncated observations (no bond issuance) not 
dominate. We do include in the selection equation (the probit), the ratio of debt service to 
exports, which appears to influence the issuance decision but not the determination of 
spreads. 
36 In the regressions, we use the log of R, which has a distribution that is much closer to 
normal than the (skewed) distribution of R.  We also allow all coefficients—and not just 
the variables of immediate interest, R and the IMF program dummy—to vary by debt 
category.   22 
The IMF dummy appears in both the selection and spreads equations.  In contrast, 
R appears only in the spreads equation. Other variables in the selection equation are the 
global and country variables from Table 3. In addition, transaction-specific variables such 
as the maturity and amount of the credit transaction and dummy variables for the 
currency of issue and production sector of issuer (not shown to conserve space) are 
included in the spreads equation.
37 Results are in Table 4.   
U.S. growth is associated with lower spreads and raises the likelihood of 
borrowing through banks and bond markets. This is again consistent with the idea that 
stronger global growth and export opportunities act as collateral for emerging markets. 
These effects are especially important for the middle debt group: an increase in monthly 
growth rate of 0.1 percent (a 1.2 percent increase in annual growth) reduces loan spreads 
in the mid-debt range by 2 per cent and bond spreads in that same range by about 4 per 
cent. Increases in issuance probabilities are somewhat smaller.  
Among the global variables, an increase in EMBI volatility has a particularly 
important quantitative effect on bond issuance when a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio is 
below 60 per cent. If daily volatility rises by one per cent (at the daily mean of 2 per 
cent), bond issuances fall by between 5 and 7 per cent (in that same debt range). 
Improved credit ratings raise the probability of borrowing while lowering spreads, 
consistent with the idea that their main effect is to increase investors’ willingness to lend.  
A 10-point improvement in the Institutional Investor rating has a large impact on spreads 
(with the largest effect in the mid-debt range, 32 per cent for loans and 48 per cent for 
bonds). For borrowers from countries with debt/GDP ratios below 60 per cent, improved 
                                                 
37 For a more extended discussion of the joint interpretation of the selection and spreads 
equation, see Eichengreen and Mody (2000).   23 
credit ratings have a relatively small impact on bank lending, suggesting that public 
rating information, while relevant to access in both markets, is less valuable for bank 
decision making under normal circumstances.   
  Our main result is that repeat borrowing reduces spreads on syndicated loans, 
while IMF programs reduce spreads in bond markets. The coefficient on the log of repeat 
bank borrowing is negative, significant and larger than the corresponding coefficient for 
bond markets.  This is true for each of the three debt/GDP categories. The effects in the 
loan market are large. A second loan reduces spreads by about 10 per cent.
38  A third loan 
has a spread about 6 per cent lower than the second loan, after which the impact declines 
to low levels.  In bond markets, in contrast, only lightly indebted countries gain from 
repeat borrowing. 
IMF programs, on the other hand, reduce spreads and enhance access mainly in 
bond markets.  This effect is most evident in medium-debt countries with debt/GDP 
ratios in the 40-60 per cent range.
39  Bond issuance by countries in this category is about 
13 per cent higher when there is a Fund program and spreads are 40 per cent lower. 
Evidently, bondholders become more willing to lend to such countries following the 
negotiation of a Fund program. IMF programs also facilitate bank borrowing by countries 
in this medium-debt range, but the impact on spreads is insignificant.  
Finally, as noted in Table 2, in the low-debt range (especially when the debt/GDP 
ratio is below 30 per cent), countries with IMF programs borrow little. Countries with 
                                                 
38 A coefficient on the log of repeated borrowing of 0.14 times the difference between log 
2 and log 1, 0.69. 
39 This finding of a strong impact of Fund programs for bond market access is also a 
central result in Mody and Saravia (2003).   24 
modest debts that nonetheless negotiate IMF programs appear to have unobserved 
characteristics that raise rather than lower spreads.
40  
In sum, repeat transactions have a significant effect mainly on bank borrowing, 
while IMF programs improve the terms of access to a greater extent for bonds. 
 
6.  Extensions 
We now explore further the robustness of these results, varying the cutoff points, 
considering the size of IMF programs, and distinguishing private and public borrowers. 
We first ask whether the results are sensitive to cut-off points for the debt/GDP 
ratio. Table 5 reports results for overlapping debt/GDP ratios, starting with the 10 to 30 
per cent range and then raising the end points by 10 percentage points over 6 intervals.
41 
Panel A, for loans, confirms the value of repeat borrowing which is significant in all 6 
intervals.  Comparison with the corresponding coefficients in Panel B shows that the 
value of repeat borrowing is greater for loans than for bonds in every debt category.  
Panel A also confirms that IMF programs do not reduce spreads significantly and are 
associated with higher spreads until the debt/GDP ratio is between 40 and 50 per cent. 
However, once the debt/GDP ratio exceeds 50 per cent, IMF programs are associated 
with a higher frequency of borrowing from banks with no apparent adverse effect on 
spreads. 
                                                 
40 Even more for loans than bonds.  
41 Ending with the 60 to 80 per cent range.  We exclude the low and high ends of the 
debt/GDP spectrum where outliers tend to drive the results.  Thus, for example, some of 
the transition countries had very low levels of debt in the mid-1990s, which may not have 
been an accurate reflection of their external obligations.   25 
Panel B confirms that repeated bond issuance lowers spreads only in the 10-30 
per cent debt/GDP range and has limited value thereafter, in fact raising spreads as if a 
multiplicity of bonds creates coordination problems. The contrasting importance of IMF 
programs is also evident. At the low end of the debt/GDP range, there is a tendency for 
Fund programs to be neutral or to reduce spreads modestly, but the effect strengthens 
noticeably as the debt/GDP ratio approaches 40-60 per cent. Beyond that, the influence of 
IMF programs on spreads falls. Fund programs are also associated with more bond 
issuance. This effect is strongest when indebtedness is between 20 and 60 per cent of 
GDP.
42 
In Table 6 we examine the influence of the size of IMF programs.
43 We interact 
the IMF program dummy with the country’s debt/GDP ratio and normalize the amount of 
IMF lending by the country’s external debt. For bonds, all the action is in the 
intermediate debt category where, as above, IMF programs have their major impact on 
spreads. The results in Table 6 thus reinforce the earlier finding that higher debt/GDP 
levels reduce the impact of IMF programs on bond markets.  At the same time, the 
amount of lending does not influence spreads. These results are consistent with the 
Fund’s value as a monitor rather than a provider of liquidity that prevents the occurrence 
of a financial crisis on account of strategic uncertainty among creditors. 
In the market for bank loans, the larger is IMF assistance the higher are spreads in 
the two low-debt categories at least.  Thus, while availability of additional IMF resources 
                                                 
42 These results support those obtained by Mody and Saravia (2003). 
43 Based on the findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 we again allow for the effect of 
programs and repeat borrowing to vary by the level of indebtedness. But to avoid 
excessively detailed results, we return to presenting results by three debt categories.   26 
allows for additional borrowing, it is as if the creditor coordination advantage is 
eliminated.
44  
In Table 7 we again consider precautionary programs. For bank loans and to a 
lesser extent for bonds, programs that are precautionary at outset reduce both issuance 
and spreads, as if countries entering such programs are more cautious in seeking access to 
private markets.
45 Spreads show a tendency to decline, as if lenders wish to acquire more 
of their debt because their credit quality is perceived favorably.  
But programs that turn precautionary tend not to have an impact on the frequency 
of either bank loans or bond issuance. However, they do have a spread-reducing effect. 
This is largest for countries in the high-debt zone.  In this range borrowers both from 
banks and on the bond market enjoy lower spreads, although the impact is larger in bond 
markets. Thus, when a country is coming off a period during which it has relied on 
official finance, a continued precautionary relationship with the Fund appears to enhance 
market access. That the relationship rather than the amount lent is what matters supports 
the idea of a Fund monitoring/country signaling function.
46  
Finally, Table 8 considers whether the market access of private borrowers is 
differentially affected by the existence of an IMF program.  In fact, repeat borrowing 
reduces spreads more strongly for bank loans than bonds irrespective of whether the 
borrower is a private- or public-sector entity.  But the effect is larger for private sector 
                                                 
44 However, in the medium-debt range, the adverse effects of increasing debt levels from 
40 to 60 percent of GDP are mitigated by the presence of an IMF program. 
45 Recall that this was what was suggested by our earlier analysis. 
46 That this function is important also to bank lenders when a country is in the high-debt 
range suggests that bank monitoring may not be enough when there is a high risk of 
insolvency.   27 
borrowers.
47  Less is publicly known about private borrowers. Their repeat borrowing 
therefore provides particularly valuable information in the syndicated loan market. In the 
bond market, in contrast, better-known private borrowers gain little from repeat 
borrowing.  In fact, public borrowers face rising spreads as they borrow more, 
presumably reflecting the dominance of coordination effects over information gains.  
The stronger influence of IMF programs when borrowing occurs through the bond 
market survives splitting the sample. Again, private borrowers gain the most. The 
principal action is still in the intermediate debt category.  In addition, the effects for 
private borrowers are substantially stronger than those for public borrowers. A Fund 
program reduces bond spreads for private borrowers from countries in this intermediate 




  Bank loans and bonds are alternative ways of transferring capital to emerging 
markets. The growth of global bond markets is of course one of the signal features of the 
last 15 years of international financial history. Transacting through bond markets has 
advantages for investors, notably greater scope for diversifying country risk.  Given the 
advance of securitization across a broad front, it is therefore important to observe that 
bank finance continues to play an important role in international financial markets.  Bank 
loans are easier to access for borrowers new to such markets, since banks have a 
                                                 
47 Thus, a second loan reduces the spreads charged private bank borrowers by about 13 
percent, while public borrowers achieve, on average, a 7 percent spread reduction. 
48 The direction of influence is the same for public issuers, but the size and statistical 
significance of the outcome is weaker.   28 
comparative advantage in bridging information asymmetries.  Banks’ intermediation 
technologies are also better suited to providing small loans.   
  We show in this paper how the ability of banks to bridge information asymmetries 
is supported by repeat borrowing. As borrowers return for credit, they reveal information 
about themselves, reducing uncertainty and incurring a lower risk premium on their 
loans.  Since the issuers of bonds are better known, the value of information obtained 
through repeat issuance is less. Indeed, to the extent that it results in a proliferation of 
separate bond issues, repeat borrowing may in fact increase the risk premium, reflecting 
the greater difficulty of coordinating the holders of different issues in the event of debt-
servicing difficulties. 
  These observations have obvious relevance to arguments about IMF monitoring 
and surveillance.  Our results suggest that IMF monitoring and surveillance matter more 
in bond markets.  This role for the IMF has the largest impact when debts reach 40 per 
cent of GDP and countries are therefore vulnerable to liquidity shocks. However, as debts 
continue rising from there, the impact of monitoring declines. There being relatively little 
uncertainty about the nature of the problem, lenders now care mainly about whether the 
IMF is providing real resources that help to keep debt service current.  But as debt and 
insolvency risk grow still higher, even significant amounts of additional official finance 
may not make a difference.  At that point, what matters most is when programs turn 
precautionary, signaling that conditions have improved sufficiently that the country no 
longer requires financial assistance. 
The approach taken here points to the importance of distinguishing international 
capital flows by instrument and intermediary.  Macroeconomic analyses lumping together   29 
bank loans and bonds tend to neglect important differences between these market 
segments stemming from the nature of the information environment, the monitoring 
technology, and the scope for creditor coordination.  We have shown in this paper that 
these distinctions are important for understanding the impact of IMF programs.  We 
would conjecture that they are equally important for understanding a variety of other 
issues in international finance.  30 
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Table 1: Trends in International Bond and Bank Lending 
 
   
Number of Transactions 
Aggregate Value of Transactions  
(US$ billions) 
Year  Bonds  Loans  Total  Bonds  Loans  Total 
1991  81  209  290  10  24  34 
1992  177  252  429  21  18  39 
1993  357  376  733  45  27  73 
1994  307  508  815  39  40  79 
1995  369  750  1,119  48  56  104 
1996  522  1,066  1,588  81  83  164 
1997  555  1,248  1,803  100  125  225 
1998  234  550  784  52  62  114 
1999  334  402  736  65  47  113 
2000  284  532  816  59  81  141 
2001  290  470  760  78  62  140 
2002  219  384  603  63  44  107 
   Total  3,729  6,747  10,476  661  669  1,331 
   34 
Table 2: Number of Transactions, by Debt Category and IMF Program 
 
Type of Credit  Debt/GDP Range (0-30 percent) 
  No Program  IMF Program  
None  1,301  389 
Bonds  1,244  57 
Loans  2,606  99 
     
  Debt/GDP Range (30-40 percent) 
  No Program  IMF Program  
None  501  190 
Bonds  680  453 
Loans  1375  240 
  Debt/GDP Range (40-60 percent) 
  No Program  IMF Program  
None  670  500 
Bonds  380  595 
Loans  999  775 
  Debt/GDP Range (more than 60 percent) 
  No Program  IMF Program  
None  471  679 
Bonds  151  169 
Loans  309  344 
  Full Sample 
  No Program  IMF Program  
None  2,949  1,758 
Bonds  2,455  1,274 
Loans  5,289  1,458 
   35 
Table 3: The Decision to Borrow and the Choice between Bonds and Loans 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Debt/GDP<=0.40  0.40<Debt/GDP<=0.60  Debt/GDP>0.60 


















lamount    0.103    0.095    0.130 
    [2.38]*    [5.78]**    [6.45]** 
maturity    0.020    0.021    0.020 
    [2.48]*    [3.46]**    [3.99]** 
US Industrial Growth  2.242  -2.405  11.433  4.283  5.643  23.516 
  [1.29]  [0.69]  [2.07]*  [0.82]  [0.87]  [2.44]* 
Log of Swap Rate  -0.062  -0.170  -0.051  -0.023  -0.135  -0.303 
  [2.10]*  [1.40]  [0.83]  [0.42]  [1.33]  [3.77]** 
EMBI volatility  -1.367  -3.757  -1.478  -2.449  -2.021  -0.984 
  [3.68]**  [4.67]**  [1.85]  [2.46]*  [1.82]  [0.88] 
Credit Rating  0.005  -0.002  0.016  0.002  0.025  -0.001 
  [3.00]**  [0.39]  [3.60]**  [0.56]  [5.31]**  [0.28] 
Debt/GDP  0.332  -0.430  -1.094  -0.739  -0.207  -0.113 
  [1.44]  [1.51]  [2.15]*  [1.57]  [0.70]  [0.34] 
Debt Service/Exports  0.682  0.509  0.416  0.284  0.164  -0.770 
  [5.17]**  [2.89]**  [2.21]*  [2.70]**  [0.44]  [3.38]** 
Real GDP growth  0.639  -5.670  3.174  1.330  0.880  2.058 
  [0.49]  [1.70]  [1.81]  [0.50]  [0.26]  [0.72] 
Export Volatility  -0.309  -0.663  -0.974  -0.252  0.133  0.011 
  [2.56]*  [1.90]  [3.20]**  [1.33]  [0.71]  [0.12] 
Short-term/Total Debt  -0.163  -0.099  0.331  0.035  -0.387  -0.165 
  [1.17]  [0.43]  [1.05]  [0.14]  [1.06]  [0.57] 
Reserves/Imports  -0.011  0.035  0.009  -0.027  0.043  0.106 
  [0.67]  [0.92]  [0.29]  [0.64]  [1.00]  [3.81]** 
Reserves/ST Debt  -0.016  -0.029  -0.014  -0.008  -0.075  -0.013 
  [1.72]  [1.34]  [1.44]  [0.54]  [2.07]*  [0.36] 
Private Credit/GDP  0.071  0.071  -0.044  0.009  -0.068  -0.097 
  [3.44]**  [2.19]*  [0.67]  [0.23]  [1.02]  [1.96] 
Public Issuer  0.218  -0.393  0.104  -0.316  0.100  -0.477 
  [4.90]**  [4.90]**  [1.91]  [6.64]**  [1.42]  [5.24]** 
Private Issuer  0.424  -0.457  0.312  -0.514  0.303  -0.688 
  [6.80]**  [5.07]**  [5.87]**  [7.17]**  [3.66]**  [4.44]** 
IMF Program  0.027  0.290  0.141  -0.024  0.084  -0.008 
  [0.54]  [3.29]**  [3.45]**  [0.36]  [1.02]  [0.14] 
Precautionary  -0.069  -0.073  -0.184  0.131  -0.047  -0.061 
  [1.08]  [0.32]  [1.97]*  [1.50]  [0.23]  [0.72] 
Turned Precautionary  -0.007  -0.011  0.032  0.153  0.135  -0.196 
  [0.13]  [0.06]  [0.50]  [1.68]  [0.72]  [4.44]** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.20  0.44  0.33  0.24  0.29  0.42 
Observations  8505  6681  3874  2721  1976  965 
 
The values reported represent the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable (at its mean) and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. Robust z statistics 
(based on country clusters) in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Pricing of Loans and Bonds 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Loans  Bonds 
Debt/GDP range  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  Spread Equation 
Log of Amount  -0.105  -0.095  -0.084  0.033  0.000  -0.001 
  [8.24]**  [2.91]**  [3.10]**  [1.04]  [0.01]  [0.02] 
Maturity  0.040  0.008  0.012  0.014  0.008  0.012 
  [5.34]**  [0.86]  [0.62]  [2.98]**  [1.02]  [2.00]* 
US Industrial Growth  -6.521  -17.801  -8.075  -11.756  -36.014  -3.713 
  [0.92]  [2.08]*  [0.63]  [1.23]  [3.06]**  [0.21] 
Log of Swap Rate  0.258  0.005  0.263  0.246  0.263  -0.060 
  [4.24]**  [0.06]  [1.40]  [3.51]**  [1.91]  [0.32] 
EMBI volatility  -1.521  -0.202  3.481  -0.995  7.180  -0.303 
  [2.73]**  [0.12]  [1.63]  [0.60]  [1.53]  [0.12] 
Credit Rating  -0.017  -0.032  -0.022  -0.034  -0.048  -0.018 
  [4.07]**  [2.81]**  [2.70]**  [10.31]**  [5.00]**  [0.92] 
Debt/GDP  -0.472  -0.821  0.222  0.097  0.675  4.157 
  [1.22]  [0.84]  [0.50]  [0.19]  [0.60]  [2.60]** 
Real GDP growth  -6.479  -11.443  -5.028  -10.008  -9.887  -4.641 
  [2.36]*  [3.04]**  [0.97]  [3.05]**  [2.99]**  [1.53] 
Export Volatility  -0.336  -0.702  0.137  -0.218  0.678  -0.161 
  [0.54]  [1.83]  [0.99]  [0.48]  [0.54]  [1.60] 
Short-term/Total Debt  -0.214  0.267  0.252  -0.038  -0.851  0.574 
  [1.17]  [0.47]  [0.81]  [0.19]  [1.20]  [1.54] 
Reserves/Imports  0.006  0.059  -0.050  0.018  0.074  0.038 
  [0.25]  [0.98]  [0.75]  [0.67]  [1.85]  [0.74] 
Private Credit/GDP  -0.007  0.047  -0.037  0.033  -0.060  -0.260 
  [0.16]  [0.78]  [0.55]  [0.84]  [0.57]  [2.23]* 
Public Issuer  0.086  -0.291  0.197  -0.095  0.247  0.090 
  [0.42]  [0.95]  [0.58]  [0.98]  [1.85]  [0.42] 
Private Issuer  0.198  -0.162  0.267  0.195  0.520  0.599 
  [0.87]  [0.37]  [0.63]  [2.25]*  [3.34]**  [1.62] 
IMF Program  0.368  -0.041  -0.093  0.092  -0.392  -0.033 
  [3.38]**  [0.27]  [1.12]  [1.57]  [2.74]**  [0.34] 
Log of Repeat Borrowing  -0.139  -0.149  -0.142  -0.038  0.047  0.015 
  [4.27]**  [3.10]**  [4.84]**  [2.56]*  [1.54]  [0.45]   37 
 
Table 4: Pricing of Loans and Bonds (continued: selection equation) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Loans  Bonds 
Debt/GDP range  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  Selection Equation 
US Industrial Growth  7.547  14.170  2.577  2.772  13.310  13.009 
  [2.40]*  [2.11]*  [0.38]  [0.69]  [1.58]  [2.54]* 
Log of Swap Rate  -0.081  -0.141  -0.066  -0.165  -0.080  -0.240 
  [1.23]  [1.41]  [0.80]  [2.67]**  [0.99]  [4.28]** 
EMBI volatility  -0.467  -0.061  -1.810  -6.506  -4.992  -1.425 
  [0.78]  [0.05]  [2.05]*  [5.81]**  [3.92]**  [1.28] 
Credit Rating  0.011  0.018  0.016  0.008  0.017  0.015 
  [2.45]*  [3.09]**  [3.88]**  [2.17]*  [3.05]**  [5.19]** 
Debt/GDP  0.671  -1.441  -0.056  0.203  -1.470  0.831 
  [1.42]  [2.17]*  [0.22]  [0.44]  [1.96]  [2.62]** 
Debt Service/Exports  0.575  0.277  0.157  1.543  0.643  -0.090 
  [3.35]**  [1.46]  [0.47]  [6.25]**  [2.66]**  [0.55] 
Real GDP growth  2.389  4.716  1.714  -0.281  3.829  1.239 
  [0.71]  [1.82]  [0.51]  [0.17]  [1.21]  [0.50] 
Export Volatility  -0.752  -1.257  0.072  -0.585  -1.097  -0.008 
  [2.16]*  [3.08]**  [0.48]  [2.14]*  [2.18]*  [0.09] 
Short-term/Total Debt  -0.323  0.380  -0.141  -0.303  0.286  -0.308 
  [1.23]  [0.85]  [0.40]  [0.94]  [0.79]  [1.87] 
Reserves/Imports  -0.018  -0.004  0.007  -0.046  -0.009  0.034 
  [0.63]  [0.12]  [0.22]  [1.01]  [0.16]  [1.34] 
Reserves/Short-term Debt  -0.034  -0.025  -0.065  -0.044  -0.035  -0.056 
  [1.91]  [1.97]*  [1.76]  [1.74]  [1.89]  [3.40]** 
Private Credit/GDP  0.104  -0.017  0.019  0.164  -0.016  -0.066 
  [1.89]  [0.20]  [0.42]  [5.88]**  [0.26]  [1.54] 
IMF Program  -0.077  0.115  0.090  0.168  0.132  0.041 
  [0.76]  [1.61]  [1.23]  [2.23]*  [1.96]  [1.44] 
Public Issuer  0.591  0.414  0.560  0.211  -0.142  -0.159 
  [9.51]**  [6.35]**  [8.60]**  [1.76]  [1.76]  [2.50]* 
Private Issuer  0.811  0.713  0.670  0.365  -0.010  -0.107 
  [11.43]**  [9.77]**  [13.07]**  [2.97]**  [0.13]  [1.38] 
Lambda  -0.032  0.054  0.081  -0.044  -0.657  0.145 
  [0.35]  [0.15]  [0.52]  [0.60]  [3.20] **  [0.44] 
No. of Transactions  4278  1771  648  2220  899  281 
             
Observations  6389  3102  1783  4510  2351  1310 
             
Robust z statistics, based on country clusters, in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
             
Note: Among issuer types, sovereign is the omitted category. The spreads equation also has dummy 
variables for sector of issuer (e.g., manufacturing, services, finance) interacted with issuer type (public, 
private). Also included are dummy variables for currency of issue and, for bond markets, a dummy variable 
for fixed rather than a floating rate of interest. In the selection equation, the values reported represent the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable (at its mean) and the 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.   38 
Table 5A: Loans: Impact of IMF Programs and Repeat Borrowing 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Debt Range  
(% of GDP) 
  10-30   20-40   30-50   40-60   50-70  60-80 
Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.561  0.230  0.272  -0.041  -0.091  -0.081 
  [3.06]**  [2.25]*  [3.53]**  [0.27]  [0.70]  [0.88] 
Repeat Borrowing  -0.174  -0.090  -0.058  -0.149  -0.159  -0.146 
  [4.89]**  [3.05]**  [2.77]**  [3.10]**  [3.99]**  [5.15]** 
Selection Equation 
IMF Program  0.120  0.045  0.041  0.115  0.162  0.135 
  [1.30]  [0.51]  [0.48]  [1.61]  [1.99]*  [1.55] 
             
No. of Transactions  1908  2598  2426  1771  1355  571 
             
Observations  2960  4066  3804  3102  2647  1471 
 
 
Table 5B: Bonds: Impact of IMF Programs and Repeat Borrowing 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Debt Range  
(% of GDP) 
  10-30   20-40   30-50   40-60   50-70  60-80 
Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.034  -0.000  -0.043  -0.392  -0.252  -0.023 
  [0.26]  [0.01]  [0.55]  [2.74]**  [1.86]  [0.20] 
Repeat Borrowing  -0.067  -0.022  -0.004  0.047  0.067  0.013 
  [2.92]**  [1.50]  [0.28]  [1.54]  [2.31]*  [0.39] 
Selection Equation 
IMF Program  0.153  0.250  0.221  0.132  0.045  0.048 
  [1.78]  [2.90]**  [2.92]**  [1.96]  [1.05]  [1.51] 
             
No. of Transactions  789  1653  1539  899  580  272 
             
Observations  1911  3227  3038  2351  1973  1212 
 
Robust z statistics, based on country clusters, in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. Other variables included in these regressions are those listed in Table 4, 
including those referred to in the footnote to that Table. In the selection equation, the 
values reported represent the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, 
continuous variable (at its mean) and the discrete change in the probability for dummy 
variables.   39 
Table 6: Does the Amount of IMF Lending Matter? 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Loans  Bonds 
Debt/GDP range  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.689  1.623  -0.122  0.270  -2.469  -1.052 
  [1.15]  [3.74]**  [0.15]  [0.65]  [2.04]*  [0.87] 
IMF*Debt/GDP  -1.550  -3.818  -0.039  -0.737  4.354  1.393 
  [0.86]  [3.98]**  [0.03]  [0.59]  [1.81]  [0.79] 
IMF Amount/Debt  2.941  6.922  1.801  1.343  -2.401  1.846 
  [2.76]**  [5.05]**  [0.82]  [1.64]  [0.99]  [1.13] 
Log of Repeat Borrowing  -0.143  -0.139  -0.146  -0.040  0.051  0.018 
  [4.48]**  [3.27]**  [4.83]**  [2.64]**  [1.76]  [0.55] 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  -0.063  0.141  0.226  -0.237  0.941  0.409 
  [0.20]  [0.29]  [0.48]  [0.83]  [2.28]*  [1.04] 
IMF*Debt/GDP  -0.106  -0.371  -0.210  1.245  -2.991  -0.689 
  [0.12]  [0.38]  [0.35]  [1.38]  [2.50]*  [1.11] 
IMF Amount/Debt  0.386  4.357  0.033  0.376  3.047  1.205 
  [0.32]  [3.03]**  [0.02]  [0.34]  [1.34]  [1.27] 
             
Number of Transactions  4278  1771  648  2220  899  281 
Observations  6389  3102  1783  4510  2351  1483 
             
 
Robust z statistics, based on country clusters, in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. Other variables included in these regressions are those listed in Table 4, 
including those referred to in the footnote to that Table. In the selection equation, the 
values reported represent the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, 
continuous variable (at its mean) and the discrete change in the probability for dummy 
variables. 
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Table 7A: Bank Loans: Is Precaution Valuable? 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Debt Range  
(% of GDP) 
  10-30   20-40   30-50   40-60   50-70  60-80 
Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.587  0.291  0.299  0.086  0.151  0.206 
  [2.92]**  [2.95]**  [3.15]**  [0.59]  [0.94]  [2.07]* 
Precautionary  -0.372  -0.533  -0.125  -0.348  -0.470  -0.477 
   Program  [1.10]  [2.12]*  [0.85]  [2.02]*  [2.39]*  [2.79]** 
Turned Precautionary    -0.075  -0.022  -0.097  -0.264  -0.350 
   Program    [0.36]  [0.15]  [0.77]  [2.55]*  [2.44]* 
Repeat Borrowing  -0.174  -0.091  -0.059  -0.164  -0.186  -0.144 
  [4.89]**  [3.17]**  [2.72]**  [3.39]**  [4.90]**  [5.23]** 
Selection Equation 
IMF Program  0.166  0.093  0.086  0.196  0.250  0.149 
  [1.88]  [0.92]  [0.88]  [2.69]**  [2.71]**  [2.16]* 
Precautionary  -0.341  -0.172  -0.200  -0.272  -0.310  -0.177 
   Program  [1.68]  [1.16]  [1.30]  [2.32]*  [2.07]*  [1.16] 
Turned Precautionary    -0.117  -0.055  -0.015  0.026  0.165 
   Program    [0.65]  [0.61]  [0.18]  [0.18]  [0.84] 
             
No. of Transactions  1908  2598  2426  1771  1355  571 
Observations  2960  4066  3804  3102  2647  1471 
 
Table 7B: Bonds: Is Precaution Valuable?  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Debt Range  
(% of GDP) 
10-30  20-40  30-50  40-60  50-70  60-80 
Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.053  0.043  0.014  -0.282  0.013  0.148 
  [0.37]  [0.81]  [0.17]  [2.50]*  [0.08]  [1.36] 
Precautionary  -0.198  -0.077  -0.153  -0.140  -0.283  -0.372 
   Program  [0.96]  [0.28]  [1.31]  [0.98]  [0.82]  [3.20]** 
Turned Precautionary    -0.131  -0.130  -0.267  -0.622  -0.331 
   Program    [2.33]*  [2.36]*  [1.60]  [2.01]*  [2.12]* 
Repeat Borrowing  -0.068  -0.023  -0.005  0.049  0.065  0.007 
  [2.98]**  [1.66]  [0.37]  [1.74]  [2.32]*  [0.24] 
Selection Equation 
IMF Program  0.248  0.238  0.233  0.112  0.065  0.065 
  [2.63]**  [2.48]*  [2.88]**  [1.99]*  [0.94]  [1.45] 
Precautionary  -0.324  -0.290  -0.155  -0.067  -0.115  -0.064 
   Program  [2.93]**  [2.03]*  [1.75]  [0.62]  [1.06]  [0.65] 
Turned Precautionary    0.138  0.033  0.161  0.064  -0.003 
   Program    [1.52]  [0.32]  [1.25]  [0.47]  [0.03] 
             
No. of Transactions  789  1653  1539  899  580  272 
Observations  1911  3227  3038  2351  1973  1212   41 
Robust z statistics, based on country clusters, in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Other 
variables included in these regressions are those listed in Table 4, including those referred to in the footnote 
to that Table. In the selection equation, the values reported represent the probability for an infinitesimal 
change in each independent, continuous variable (at its mean) and the discrete change in the probability for 
dummy variables. 
   42 
Table 8: Do Private Borrowers Benefit More than Public Borrowers From IMF 
Programs? 
 
A: Private Borrowers 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Loans  Bonds 
Debt/GDP range  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.245  -0.116  -0.114  0.096  -0.466  -0.031 
  [2.25]*  [0.56]  [1.19]  [1.62]  [2.85]**  [0.13] 
Log of Repeat Borrowing  -0.133  -0.179  -0.179  -0.098  -0.034  -0.103 
  [4.14]**  [2.93]**  [7.08]**  [4.52]**  [1.33]  [1.50] 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  -0.044  0.091  0.130  0.200  0.266  -0.018 
  [0.77]  [2.01]*  [1.46]  [2.71]**  [2.51]*  [0.65] 
             
Number of Transactions              
Observations  3315  1672  784  2109  890  452 
 
B: Public Borrowers 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Loans  Bonds 
Debt/GDP range  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  0.599  -0.065  -0.038  0.118  -0.153  0.018 
  [5.12]**  [0.50]  [0.26]  [1.34]  [1.55]  [0.22] 
Log of Repeat Borrowing  -0.138  -0.109  -0.075  -0.014  0.099  0.083 
  [4.38]**  [2.10]*  [1.10]  [0.61]  [2.67]**  [4.82]** 
  Spread Equation 
IMF Program  -0.053  0.054  0.045  0.085  0.075  0.072 
  [0.49]  [0.85]  [1.19]  [1.35]  [1.16]  [2.37]* 
             
Number of Transactions              
Observations  3074  1430  999  2401  1461  858 
             
Robust z statistics, based on country clusters, in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. Other variables included in these regressions are those listed in Table 4, 
including those referred to in the footnote to that Table. In the selection equation, the 
values reported represent the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, 
continuous variable (at its mean) and the discrete change in the probability for dummy 




The bond dataset, obtained from Loanware and Bondware covers the period 1991 to 2002 
and includes: (1) launch spreads over risk free rates (in basis points, where one basis 
point is one-hundredth of a percentage point); (2) the amount of the issue (millions of 
US$); (3) the maturity in years; (4) whether the borrower was a sovereign, other public 
sector entity, or private debtor;  (5) currency of issue; (6) whether the bond had a fixed or 
floating rate; (7) borrower’s industrial sector: manufacturing, financial services, utility or 
infrastructure, other services, or government (where government, in this case, refers to 





(1) United States industrial production growth rate: average of month-month growth rate 
over a quarter. (2) United States ten-year swap spread. (3) Emerging Market Bond Index: 




Variable  (Billions)  Periodicity  Source    Series   
Total external debt 
(EDT) 













National  Annual  WEO  NGDP_R 
 
Total debt service 
(TDS) 
US$  Annual  WEO  DS 
Exports (XGS)  US$  Annual  WEO  BX 
Exports (X)  US$  Monthly  IFS  M#c|70__dzf 
Reserves 
(RESIMF) 
US$  Quarterly  IFS  q#c|_1l_dzf 










US$  semi-annual  BIS 
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Total bank debt 
(BISTOT)
3 










Debt/GNP  EDT/GNP 
Debt service/exports  TDS/XGS 
GDP/growth  0.25*ln[GDP90_t/GDP90_{t-1}] 
Standard deviation of export growth  Standard deviation of monthly growth rates 
of exports (over six months) 
Reserves/imports  RESIMF/IMP 
Reserves/GNP  RESIMF/GNP 
Reserves/short-term debt  RESIMF/BISSHT 
Short-term debt/total debt  BISSHT/BISTOT 
Domestic credit/GDP  CLM_PVT/(GDPNC/4) 
 
   Sources: International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS);IMF program data from the IMF’s Executive 
Board Documents and Staff Estimates; World Bank’s World Debt Tables (WDT) and 
Global Development Finance (GDF); Bank of International Settlements’ The Maturity, 
Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending. Credit ratings were 
obtained from Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings. Missing data for some 
countries was completed using the US State Department' s Annual Country reports on 
Economic Policy and Trade Practices (which are available on the internet from 
http:www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/). U.S. industrial production was 
obtained from the Federal Reserve and Swap rates and EMBI from Bloomberg. 
 
1Credit to private sector. 
2 Cross-border bank claims in all currencies and local claims in nonlocal currencies of 
maturity up to and including one year. 
3 Total consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in nonlocal 
currencies. 
 
 